Political analyst and columnist Hani Al-Masri argues that the eighth conference of Fatah concluded amid widespread attention, not only because it is the largest movement conference in the Palestinian arena, but because it was held at an exceptional moment for both the Palestinian cause and the wider region. In his view, the conference should not be judged merely by its organizational outcomes or by the names of winners and losers, since they are not the real decision-makers. The deeper question, he writes, is whether the conference succeeded in offering new answers to the deep-rooted and complex crisis facing the movement and the Palestinian political system, and how that crisis can be overcome.
From an organizational standpoint, the conference succeeded in convening and reproducing the movement’s leadership institutions. Yet politically, “the same old order remained standing” despite the introduction of several new faces. Changing individuals did not mean changing the political course or performance, nor did it bring forward figures willing to champion and fight for a genuine alternative. Most of the “new” faces, in reality, were old hands themselves.
By adopting the opening speech delivered by Mahmoud Abbas, the conference effectively reaffirmed “the same path that brought us to the catastrophe we are living through.” There was no real debate over the political program or any substantive issue beyond competition for positions, influence, and seats on the Central Committee and Revolutionary Council. Nor was there any meaningful review , deep or otherwise , of the movement’s trajectory since the previous conference, of missed opportunities, or of where the Palestinian cause stands today amid mounting existential threats and shrinking opportunities.
The conference leaned more toward rearranging internal balances than producing a genuine political or intellectual shift. Rather than resolving the crisis, it merely exposed and deepened it further.
This is particularly evident in what is unfolding in the Gaza Strip, which is living through “a new Nakba” and an ongoing war of aggression even during periods of ceasefire, amid attempts to impose what is falsely called a “Peace Council” under Palestinian, Arab, and international cover. In the West Bank, de facto annexation and the imposition of Israeli sovereignty continue to accelerate in the face of Arab and international silence, while the Palestinian leadership clings to a barren strategy of waiting, avoiding confrontation, and “removing pretexts,” despite its repeated failure. Meanwhile, within Palestinian society inside Israel, organized crime continues to spread while racist policies deepen.
Against this backdrop, the fall of some old-guard figures or the absence of certain historic leaders from the race carries little significance unless a genuine alternative emerges , one capable of formulating a comprehensive vision, new strategies, and leadership equal to the gravity of the moment. New faces alone mean little without a new vision and new performance, and without empowering them to truly lead during what he describes as the most dangerous stage the Palestinian cause has faced.
Holding the conference under such difficult political, security, and internal conditions was no small feat. It also demonstrated that Fatah still retains a degree of internal cohesion despite the steady decline it has experienced since the Oslo Accords, which marked its transformation from a national liberation movement into “an authority party under occupation.” That transformation, he argues, has now reached the stage of administering the population under occupation without vision, will, meaningful resistance, or even a practical plan to end the occupation and achieve Palestinian independence , or to adopt any alternative path.
“The survival of the Authority, and specifically the survival of the leadership, has become the real objective,” he writes, despite internal divisions that are likely to deepen after the conference. He points in particular to the way the preparatory committee , which itself included many of the candidates , selected conference members who would later vote for them, a process he argues undermines the conference’s legitimacy and credibility.
The conference also reflected Fatah’s continued centrality within the Palestinian political system and within the Palestine Liberation Organization, though with clear shifts in internal balances of power. Majed Faraj came second after imprisoned leader Marwan Barghouti, followed by Jibril Rajoub, Hussein al-Sheikh, Leila Ghannam, and Mahmoud al-Aloul.
At the same time, no candidate from outside Palestine won a seat despite the fact that half of the Palestinian people live in the diaspora , something he says reflects the grip of money, security institutions, bureaucratic power, and patronage networks over the movement. There were also notable imbalances in regional representation, with Ramallah receiving the largest share, followed by Nablus, while Hebron , the largest governorate , received limited representation, as did Gaza relative to its size and role.
But “organizational success” alone is not enough to declare the conference politically or nationally successful. The movement’s central crisis is not merely an internal electoral issue, but a crisis of national vision, role, and function , as well as a crisis of a sidelined PLO and an Authority teetering on the edge of collapse.
The real question, therefore, is why the conference failed to undertake a serious political review of the previous period. The answer, he suggests, is that any serious review would inevitably require changing course , and that would mean confronting the occupation and paying the price that comes with it, even though a form of resistance with “reasonable cost” remains both possible and necessary.
Nor did the conference put forward a new vision suited to the dramatic transformations underway or to the dead end that has been reached. It failed to prioritize national unity around shared goals and a strategy for achieving them. The only explanation for this failure, he argues, is the triumph of private interests over the public good. This also explains the lack of genuine intent to broaden political participation through reforming decision-making mechanisms within Fatah and, by extension, within the Authority and the PLO, where power remains concentrated in the hands of the president and a small inner circle rather than institutions.
“The intense scramble for conference membership and candidacy for the Central Committee and Revolutionary Council is not a sign of vitality,” he writes, “but of declining standards and a loss of confidence in the leadership.”
Following the Palestinian split, the political crisis deepened dramatically. The Legislative Council was dissolved, and executive, legislative, and judicial powers were consolidated in the hands of a single individual rather than a single faction. It has become difficult, he argues, to even say that Fatah truly governs the Authority, since the president now rules through a network of individuals , some from Fatah and others from outside it , while still relying on the movement’s historical legitimacy and popular weight.
Had the competition inside the conference revolved around ideas, programs, and strategies, geographic affiliation would not have mattered so much. Those elected, in theory, should be serving the national project rather than their own local networks, loyalists, or “cheerleaders/Saheeja”
The absence of the so-called reformist current from the conference appears tied less to disagreements over political choices than to disputes over influence, power, succession, and regional alliances.
Among the most significant transformations within Fatah has been its shift from a broad-based movement resembling Palestinian society in all its diversity into an authority party that no longer tolerates ideological or political pluralism. There is now only one accepted political line, with disagreement permitted only around its margins, not against it or in favor of an alternative.
He warns that this model now appears to be extending across Palestinian political life through laws and procedures designed to curb pluralism and enforce loyalty to the leadership’s program and commitments, despite previous decisions by Palestinian institutions calling for a reassessment of those commitments.
If this trajectory continues, it threatens Palestinian political life itself, lowering the ceiling of public engagement to local and service-related concerns while eroding the pluralism that long served as a source of strength and resilience for the Palestinian cause.
Nothing reflected this trend more clearly than the “pledge of allegiance” granted to Abbas at the start of the conference through applause rather than a secret ballot, without accountability for the previous phase or opening the door to competition. Politically and organizationally, he argues, such endorsement should have come at the end of the conference , after evaluating the previous period and its political, economic, democratic, and institutional failures , not at the beginning. What happened, he says, amounted to reproducing “the worst models of one-man systems and parties.”
Another sign of deterioration was the overwhelming rush to compete for conference membership and leadership positions. Rather than signaling dynamism, it reflected declining standards, with many now seeing themselves as entitled to positions that were once viewed as burdensome responsibilities rather than privileges and spoils.
In this context, the candidacy of the president’s son stands out. He lacks, the article argues, the political, popular, or militant history that would justify his rise, relying primarily on his father’s influence, official receptions, and support from institutions and security bodies. This raises serious concerns about political inheritance , “a phenomenon for which many Arab countries have paid a heavy price.” Although internal and external opposition suggests that such a path will not be easy, merely raising the prospect reveals the depth of the structural crisis facing both the movement and the political system.
At its core, the conference was more about rearranging internal balances than achieving a genuine political or intellectual transformation. It therefore failed to resolve the crisis and instead deepened it further. Speeches and official documents may have reaffirmed national constants and the need to confront the occupation, but rhetoric alone is no longer enough without a clear strategy explaining how that confrontation will occur, especially after the practical collapse of the peace process and amid continued annexation, displacement, extermination, apartheid, settlement expansion, the isolation of Jerusalem from its surroundings, the deepening separation between the West Bank and Gaza, and the destruction of any meaningful political role for the Authority.
“It is time to abandon illusions of every kind,” the article concludes, “to stop both political concessions and military adventurism,” and instead pursue “a realistic, national, revolutionary, and resistant option” capable of combining steadfast commitment to Palestinian rights with a practical understanding of reality and the ability to act effectively.
Still, the mere holding of the conference at this stage carries significance. Fatah understands that paralysis can no longer continue indefinitely and that it faces genuine existential challenges brought about by regional and international transformations as well as changes within Palestinian society itself. Yet it still lacks the awareness and political will necessary to formulate the alternative capable of confronting and overcoming those challenges.
In the final analysis, the conference succeeded in preserving the continuity of the movement and its institutions, but failed to restore its former vitality, unity, or liberationist role. It did not halt the bleeding, fragmentation, exclusion of capable figures and veteran activists, or the widening gap between the movement and Palestinian society. Nor did it provide a genuine political or intellectual breakthrough.
The major questions therefore remain unanswered: How can Fatah reclaim its role as a national liberation movement? Is it already too late? How can the PLO be revived from what he describes as its “intensive care unit”? How can the relationship with society be rebuilt, resilience strengthened, Palestinians at home and abroad united, and balance restored between the needs of the movement, the Authority, the PLO, and the national project itself?
Those questions were never seriously addressed inside the conference hall. Yet answering them, he concludes, will determine not only the future of Fatah, but perhaps the future of the entire Palestinian political system in the years ahead